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The cliff note version of the Orange Revolution is well known:  At the end of 2004, 
Ukrainians peacefully and joyfully rose up against a discredited regime following a 
discredited presidential election purportedly won by a discredited candidate.  Hundreds 
of thousands of Ukrainians descended on Ukraine’s capital city of Kyiv to reject the 
claim that the government-backed candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, had 
won the presidential election run-off.  Ukrainians gathered en masse to insist that Viktor 
Yushchenko, the internationally recognized winner of the poll, be allowed to fulfill his 
mandate.  Kyiv turned orange, as everyone from shopkeepers to taxi drivers to bank 
presidents adopted Yushchenko’s campaign color as their own.  After 17 days of loud 
but orderly protest, the newly emboldened Supreme Court ordered a repeat of the 
presidential run-off.  Less than two weeks later, Yushchenko celebrated his victory in 
that poll.  In one month, the Ukrainian people had reset their country’s political and 
geographical orientation and had demonstrated their support for freedom, democracy 
and truth.  The “power of the people” had triumphed – a point clear to anyone who had 
visited Kyiv during the previous weeks.
 
On November 27, six days after the start of the revolution, Tom Warner of the Financial 
Times attempted to describe the atmosphere created by the thousands of people 
flooding into downtown Kyiv.  “The growing crowds have taken on a dynamic of their 
own,” he wrote.  “Whatever one names it, the movement Mr. Yushchenko began has 
become an awesome demonstration of popular power.” (1)
 
“Popular power” it most certainly was – of a kind rarely seen in one lifetime.  But did 
Viktor Yushchenko really begin this “movement”?  And when did it truly originate?   
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Upon examination, and when placed within the context of Ukraine’s major political 
battles of the last four years, the Orange Revolution can be viewed as the spectacular 
culmination of a movement that found its roots in the year 2000. 
 
There is no doubt that Viktor Yushchenko’s stolen election victory was the rallying cry 
for the thousands who occupied Kyiv’s Independence Square.  Clearly, he is the man 
Ukrainians have charged with leading them as they move toward Europe.  He is by far 
the most trusted political leader in the country and the man seen as Ukraine’s best hope 
for the future.    Also clearly, opposition leader and now Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko spurred the crowds on with her spirited speeches and with her reputation 
as Ukraine’s most unwavering opposition leader.  But, as they look back on their victory, 
Ukrainians have someone else equally important to thank for their success (albeit 
unintentionally) – former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. 
 
The Orange Revolution was a largely spontaneous outpouring of anger and hope on the 
part of the people; for the country’s political leaders, however, it was the culmination of 
years of preparation by opposition forces, and even more important, the almost direct 
result of miscalculations by the Kuchma regime.  Without the actions of Leonid Kuchma 
and his entourage, Viktor Yushchenko and many of his allies might not have chosen the 
route of revolution.  But Kuchma gave Yushchenko little choice – despite Yushchenko’s 
repeated and sometimes plaintive requests for a way out. 
 
As 1999 gave way to the year 2000, Kuchma began moving down a brash, bumbling 
and often thuggish path designed to neutralize his opponents.   Disagreement and 
debate were no longer tolerated.  All power would be consolidated in his hands and in 
the hands of his allies. The tactic, also being pursued in an almost identical fashion in 
neighboring Russia, had quick, superficial success.  But, the resilience of his opponents 
–most particularly Tymoshenko – was unexpected, and the long-term effect of his 
attacks was not predicted.   
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Kuchma’s attempts to neutralize the opposition began in earnest in mid-2000 with an 
attack on the Communists and Socialists, but he gradually worked to undermine, in 
some way, all forces opposing him.  
 
The path to revolution was paved by Kuchma and/or his allies when they undermined 
the Communist and Socialist Parties in parliament, ceaselessly harassed and arrested 
opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko, became implicated in the death of Georgiy 
Gongadze, rigged the parliamentary elections of 2002, undertook a demonizing 
campaign against Viktor Yushchenko, and finally staged the fraudulent elections of 
2004, complete with a brazen poisoning of Yushchenko.  For the duration of most of 
Kuchma’s attack, Yushchenko rebuffed the more radical methods of the declared 
opposition.  He repeatedly reached out to Kuchma and his parliamentary allies, 
attempting to change the direction of the government from within.  However, every one 
of his overtures was met with an attack.  Finally, faced with no other alternative, Viktor 
Yushchenko was left to ally with a waiting opposition, and take up a position of direct 
conflict with the authorities.
 
The shadows of this “waiting opposition” began to form around Socialist Party leader 
Oleksandr Moroz as early as 1998, but truly began to consolidate in 2000.  Its 
development is complicated, yet clear.
 
Prior to 2000, Ukraine’s parliament was controlled by a majority coalition made up of the 
Communist and Socialist Parties, as well as numerous smaller leftist groupings, and 
was sometimes tacitly supported by the presidential administration.  From 1994-1998, 
Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz served as the speaker of parliament.  His reign 
ended as speaker in mid-1998 when President Kuchma successfully organized a bloc of 
deputies who agreed not to vote in his favor.  Although Kuchma and Moroz had never 
been particularly friendly, the move cemented Moroz’s opposition to the president and 
allowed him more freedom in criticizing the president – something that would soon be 
essential to opposition politics in Ukraine. 
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In late 1999, with Ukraine’s economy floundering, and a former prime minister under 
international investigation for embezzlement, (2) President Kuchma and his allies–
including newly confirmed Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko–removed any backing they 
may have given to the leftist coalition.  They began working toward a “reformist” 
parliamentary majority, led by a “reformist” speaker.  In February of 2000, this goal was 
achieved when Oleksandr Tkachenko was replaced by the pro-presidential Ivan 
Pluysch. 
 
The change in the composition of the parliamentary majority was hailed by the 
Ukrainian government, international financiers and investors.  Ukraine had finally moved 
out from under the shadow of the Communist Party.  It was unquestionably a positive 
step for Ukraine; for the first time the government was able to enact truly reform-
oriented legislation.  Additionally, in the long-term, the move had unexpected 
consequences–it led to the creation of the first true opposition force in Ukraine.
 
In response to the loss of their majority, leftist deputies announced numerous protests, 
and suggested that they would fight vigorously for their positions in the future.  In that 
moment, Ukraine not only began moving forward on necessary reforms, but also saw 
the Communist and Socialist Parties transformed, at least temporarily, into a true 
opposition force led by individuals who no longer had any stake in the government.  
This fact became vital just a few months later when the headless body of journalist 
Georgiy Gongadze was discovered. 
 
Without question, the murder of investigative journalist Georgiy Gongadze was a 
watershed moment for Ukraine.  Gongadze was one of the founders of the opposition-
oriented Ukrayinska Pravda website, and regularly examined and criticized the influence 
of business interests, or “oligarchic clans,” on the functioning of the government. 
 
Gongadze disappeared on September 16, 2000. Three weeks later, a decapitated body 
identified as Gongadze’s by his family and colleagues was discovered in a village 
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outside Kyiv.  Immediately, calls for the government to investigate the case actively 
came from political opposition and media circles.  Very little was done. 
 
Then, on November 28, 2000, Oleksandr Moroz called a press conference to play 
secretly recorded conversations of President Kuchma – conversations which included 
discussions of how to “shut up” Gongadze.   The conversations reportedly were held 
shortly before the journalist’s disappearance.  Moroz stated, “The President was worried 
by Gongadze’s activities, gave instructions and controlled their execution.” (3)
 
Kuchma immediately denied the accusation, labeled the tapes as fake, and threatened 
to sue Moroz for slander. (4) Moroz responded that he had done nothing wrong, and 
called for an official parliamentary probe into the situation.  “Then,” he said, “we could 
get the grounds for launching an impeachment case against Kuchma.” (5) It was the 
first time a major political figure suggested such a scenario. 
 
Authentication of both the tapes and the body began immediately, and months passed 
as Moroz and Kuchma traded threats and demands.  Throughout these months, protest 
actions built.  The appearance of the tapes provided the opposition with a “cause,” and 
also provided an outlet for Ukrainians who had watched their economy and living 
standards plummet under Kuchma. 
 
On the 15th of December, 500 protestors announced a “sit-in” at Independence Square 
in Kyiv.  In a scenario almost identical to that which began the Orange Revolution, the 
protestors rallied and pitched tents, to form a camp where they threatened to stay until 
the president was impeached. (6)
 
On December 19, more than 5,000 protestors descended on Independence Square.  
The demonstrators were joined by a number of parliamentary deputies, including Moroz 
and the leaders of both the Communist Party and the extreme nationalist Ukrainian 
People’s Association (UNA-UNSO). (7) At the same time, over 1,000 people gathered 
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outside the parliament building shouting one of the slogans later adopted by the Orange 
Revolution, “Kuchma, Het,” or Kuchma, Out. (8)
 
Also on December 19, 2000, a few brave political leaders found the will to unite.  
Leaders of the Communist and Socialist Parties were joined publicly in opposition to 
Kuchma by the leaders of several smaller parties–the radical UNA-UNSO, the rightist 
People’s Rukh, and the centrist Yabloko and Sobor parties.  They named their new 
alliance “Ukraine Without Kuchma.”   UNA-UNSO member Ruslan Zaitsenko said, 
“Kuchma has to go.  That will sort things out.  Then, our first choice [for president] will 
be Prime Minister Yushchenko.” (9)
 
However, as of mid-December, Yushchenko had made no public comment about the 
Gongadze issue.  Instead, he responded to protestor’s demands by arranging a meeting 
with the president for the leaders of the action.  At the meeting, according to then-
Socialist representative and current Minister of the Interior Yuri Lutsenko, Kuchma 
agreed to dismiss three officials implicated in the Gongadze tapes.  Lutsenko told 
reporters that Interior Minister Yuri Kravchenko, Ukrainian Security Service Director 
Leonid Derkach and Customs Head Yuri Solovkov would be replaced.  If Kuchma had 
fulfilled his promise, it is likely that the protest action would have lost much of its 
impetus.  However, he quickly backtracked; his spokeswoman suggested that at 
Yushchenko’s request the president had only agreed to consider replacing the officials. 
(10) The president had lost an opportunity to placate his opponents, while the resolve of 
the protest leaders hardened.
 
Moroz, who reportedly had been pleased with the progress of negotiations, responded 
angrily to Kuchma’s shift.  He promised additional, larger demonstrations.  “We will not 
tolerate the situation when the president tells protestors’ representatives one thing, and 
his press secretary later denies what the president said,” he told journalists. (11)
 
The plan to expand the protests was cut short, however, as a Kyiv court responded to a 
government request by immediately banning all protest actions around government 
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buildings “for the holiday period.”  The measure unexpectedly went into effect on 
December 22, the day after the meeting with Kuchma.  The court announced that the 
ban would lift on January 29.
 
Kuchma used the court-ordered cessation of protests to what he undoubtedly believed 
would be good advantage.  On January 19, President Kuchma fired Yulia Tymoshenko, 
then the Deputy Prime Minister for Fuel and Energy, who had been charged with 
embezzlement and tax evasion conveniently just days earlier.
 
The president’s actions came after almost a year of wrangling between Kuchma and 
Tymoshenko, as he attempted to control her energy sector reforms and she attempted 
to end the “schemes” used by energy companies – often connected to him and his 
friends–to avoid taxation.   The actions also came after Tymoshenko announced her 
belief that Kuchma’s involvement in Gongadze’s death was “an established fact,” and 
after she encouraged other security personnel to publicize illegal actions by officials. 
(12)
 
Tymoshenko came to the cabinet fresh from leading the multi-billion dollar energy 
conglomerate Unified Energy Systems of Ukraine (UES).  Opposition to her work was to 
be expected.  Almost immediately after joining Viktor Yushchenko’s cabinet (she had 
also worked in the same position for Pavlo Lazarenko), Tymoshenko released a 
scathing statement calling on all political forces to “decisively repulse the destructive 
affairs of the oligarchs.” (13) It got plenty of attention.  Oligarchs were said to have 
complained mightily to Kuchma; the president then tried in vain to force Yushchenko to 
dismiss Tymoshenko.    She vowed repeatedly never to give in to the president’s 
pressure to resign. 
 
Before taking her on, the prosecutor-general ordered the arrest of Tymoshenko’s 
husband and several other colleagues with whom she had worked at UES.  Mykhailo 
Obikhod claimed that Oleksandr Tymoshenko had embezzled state funds while sitting 
on the board of directors at UES.  (14)
7
 Tymoshenko lashed out at the arrests, saying that the only guilt of those arrested “was 
that they were close to me.” (15) Months later, as her husband remained in prison, 
Tymoshenko continued to cling stubbornly to her position, underscoring her nickname 
as the “Iron Lady.”  At the same time, rumors began to surface that she was helping to 
finance anti-Kuchma demonstrations. (16)
 
By the time of her dismissal on January 19, 2001, Tymoshenko had been hardened into 
a staunch oppositionist.  She loudly participated in the renewal of “Ukraine Without 
Kuchma” protests and hailed the creation of a new tent city in Independence Square.  In 
addition, with Oleksandr Moroz, Tymoshenko announced an alliance of 15 parties from 
the left, right and center called the National Salvation Forum.  The Forum’s stated goal 
was to carry out “a new velvet revolution” by focusing Kyiv’s somewhat chaotic and 
uncoordinated protests on specific goals. (17)
 
It would appear that this alliance touched a governmental nerve. Four days after the 
announcement of the new pact, Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested. And, on the same day 
she was taken into custody, a letter attacking the opposition appeared throughout the 
Ukrainian press–signed by President Leonid Kuchma ä and Viktor Yushchenko.
 
Together with Parliament Speaker Lytvyn, they wrote, “The disappearance of journalist 
Georgiy Gongadze and the so-called tape scandal have been used as a reason for 
social disruption.”  The three leaders then apologized for “unprofessional conduct” in the 
investigation of the Gongadze case, but assured the public that it would be solved. 
 
Most disturbingly, Kuchma, Yushchenko and Lytvyn wrote, “Recently, a National 
Salvation Forum has appeared, based on unknown foundations, and has been widely 
publicized.  The leaders of this many-colored conglomerate, resentful of their own 
political losses and fiascos, are indeed looking for salvation – not for the state and the 
nation, but for themselves – from political bankruptcy and disappearance and – some of 
them – from criminal responsibility.” (18) The letter, timed with Tymoshenko’s arrest, 
focused national and international attention on the efforts of the government’s political 
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opponents.  But, more seriously, the signature of Ukraine’s most trusted politician on the 
letter alongside the president undermined the Ukraine Without Kuchma protest 
movement and was a significant setback for opposition attempts to mobilize citizens.  
Clearly, a deal was struck – most likely involving a promise from Kuchma not to dismiss 
Yushchenko.   In the following weeks, as Tymoshenko sat in prison, participation in 
protests fell, and momentum that had been gathering in parliament to vote no 
confidence in the prosecutor stalled.  
 
Heorhiy Omelchenko, co-chairman of the NSF, admitted on February 27 that their 
movement was not having the effect they desired.  “To oust Kuchma,” he said, “it is 
necessary one day to have as many people in the streets as there are during the 
Dynamo Kyiv-Barcelona Soccer game.  That is 100,000.”  But the protest movement 
“lacks a leader equal to Kuchma,” ITAR-TASS wrote at the time.  The news agency 
noted that Moroz’s Socialist Party “is not a mighty force,” while “Yulia Tymoshenko could 
have played the role of a Ukrainian Joan of Arc.  But her arrest ä beheaded the 
opposition.” (19) Unfortunately for Kuchma, his unwillingness to live up to his deal with 
Yushchenko, willingness to use force against tent city demonstrators, and the 
unexpected, fortuitous release of Tymoshenko, eventually would provide the opposition 
with the leadership it needed.  
 
On March 28, 2001, Yulia Tymoshenko was suddenly released from prison, after a 
brave Kyiv court ruled that the government did not have probable cause for her arrest.  
Two days later, she published a statement announcing that a unified opposition program 
of action would be undertaken “soon,” and that her primary goal remained the removal 
of “the regime preventing Ukraine’s normal development.” (20)
 
Yushchenko hailed Tymoshenko’s release, saying it would have “a positive impact.” (21) 
He also pledged to begin negotiations with his former deputy to end the “political crisis” 
in the country.  Just four days later, however, Tymoshenko was re-arrested in the 
hospital and all access to her was cut-off.  In response, Yushchenko made his first clear 
statements against Kuchma.  He termed the re-arrest a “demonstration of force 
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counterproductive for overcoming the crisis and establishing a normal political 
dialogue.”   Further, he pointed out that the action would put an end to the possibility of 
a negotiated settlement.  “It’s hard to hold talks if any of the negotiating parties are 
behind bars,” he said. (22)
 
Just over three weeks later, Viktor Yushchenko was removed as the Prime Minister of 
Ukraine.  
 
The next year saw a shift in opposition tactics; Yushchenko’s natural aversion to civil 
protest and confrontation left him and his allies in a sort of limbo – unable to commit to 
what he saw as the “radical” opposition, but at the same time not wanting to support the 
pro-presidential team.  He worked to cobble together a new political grouping made up 
of what he saw as the more moderate members of the pro-governmental forces with the 
most moderate oppositionists. 
 
In late July 2001, in preparation for the parliamentary elections of March 2002, 
Yushchenko announced the creation of the Our Ukraine Bloc.  It was as “centrist” a 
grouping as Ukraine had ever seen.  Pointedly, Yushchenko expressed no interest in 
working with either the National Salvation Forum or the Socialist Party.  In response, the 
National Salvation Forum was renamed the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, and Tymoshenko, 
who had fought attempts to return her to prison since April, repeatedly called on 
Yushchenko to join a unified opposition force.  When she received no response, she 
announced that her Bloc would concentrate on creating a regional network of opposition 
offices.  Soon after, Russian authorities announced that they had sent evidence to 
Ukraine implicating Tymoshenko in embezzlement, and urged the authorities to 
investigate the case.  She responded, “Russia is insisting on the destruction of 
Ukraine’s opposition,” and vowed to fight harder. (23)
 
By September 2001, with severe restrictions placed on her movements, and having 
survived a suspicious car accident on her way to a court appearance, Tymoshenko’s 
requests to Yushchenko began turning into demands.  She accused Yushchenko of “a 
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drift to the president” because of his Bloc’s negotiations with the deeply pro-presidential 
Regions of Ukraine party (the future party of Viktor Yanukovich), and demanded that he 
give a “specific answer” as to whether he would work with her, and if not, she asked that 
he explain why.  He responded that he objected to the amount of time she spent calling 
for the removal of the president.  “Ukraine has a president,” he said, “a symbol of its 
statehood.  I, being a citizen, have to respect this symbol.  If somebody expects 
something different from me, it’s their problem.”  Moreover, Yushchenko stressed that 
he would continue to “consult him [the president] as long as I think is needed.” (24)
 
In March 2002, Our Ukraine, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYT) and the Socialist Party 
entered the parliamentary elections separately – although Tymoshenko and Moroz 
continued to work together.
 
Despite significant charges of election rigging by the authorities, Our Ukraine, BYT and 
the Socialists all passed the 4% threshold to enter parliament.  Our Ukraine, in 
particular, passed all expectations – placing first in the party list vote with over 23 
percent.   The Communists earned over 20 percent, while pro-presidential parties 
earned approximately 20 percent.  The Tymoshenko Bloc gained approximately 7.5 
percent, and the Socialists squeaked into parliament with 5 percent.  Given the pressure 
on the two radical opposition parties – Tymoshenko’s Bloc was not even listed on 
counting forms throughout portions of the country – both Tymoshenko and Moroz 
expressed pleasure.  Our Ukraine totaled 112 parliamentary seats, the Communists 65, 
BYT and the Socialists 22 each.   However, because 50 percent of the parliament was 
made up of single-mandate districts, where pro-presidential candidates prevail more 
easily, pro-Kuchma parties received 148 parliamentary seats.  
 
Soon after, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko announced an alliance of their parties, 
together with the Socialists and the Communists to support their own can didate for 
parliamentary speaker.  The three more radical parties, however, put severe restrictions 
on the personnel they would support.  Meanwhile, Kuchma’s allies offered Yushchenko 
a deal – if Our Ukraine would join with the pro-presidential parties to support United 
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Ukraine’s Volodymyr Lytvyn as speaker, they would support Yushchenko’s 
reinstatement as prime minister.  Negotiations on this point, as well as committee 
chairs, continued for a week and were held separately from the opposition parties, 
which refused to negotiate.  Tymoshenko said, “The agreement to appoint Viktor 
Yushchenko as prime minister was brilliant bait. (. . .) Through the unrealizable dream of 
becoming prime minister, Mr. Yushchenko simply refused to lead his own majority of 
231 in parliament, which had existed for three weeks.  While the businessmen of United 
Ukraine made a show of discussing details of the agreement with Yushchenko, the 
authorities were actively pulling away people’s deputies from the opposition 
majority.”  (25)
 
By the conclusion of the negotiations, Our Ukraine’s faction had either formally or 
theoretically been deserted by nine of its deputies.  When the so-called agreement was 
reached, United Ukraine refused to support it formally, and then, by virtue of the 
shrinking size of Our Ukraine, was able to vote in Lytvyn as speaker without the 
assistance of the opposition parties.  The majority had been lost by Yushchenko and 
nothing had been gained.  Later, Tymoshenko explained, “Yushchenko is a good, gentle 
man.  An honest man.  He  trusts.  This is “not always the best thing” in political 
life.” (26)
 
Yushchenko’s trust was eroding, however, and his anger over the long series of broken 
agreements with Kuchma and his allies finally resulted in his joining with the opposition.  
On September 17, 2002, Tymoshenko, Moroz and Communist Leader Petro 
Symonenko initiated a new campaign called “Rise Up, Ukraine!”  Over 100,000 people 
descended on Independence Square, while organizers claimed that a million people 
demonstrated throughout the country.  The protestors came not just to participate in the 
rally, but to support Tymoshenko’s call that Yushchenko be elected Ukraine’s new 
president.  She called for early elections following a “velvet revolution,” and said, “The 
ideas of this revolution are pure. Therefore they will triumph.” (27) Yushchenko’s 
appearance on the stage with all other opposition leaders energized the crowd.  It was 
an indication of things to come. 
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Nevertheless, even after this demonstration, and perhaps hoping that the protest would 
have made its point, Yushchenko suggested negotiations with Kuchma.  They never 
happened.  Instead, faced with dwindling support in parliament, Yushchenko lashed out 
angrily at the president for using “criminal and political pressure” to convince members 
of Yushchenko’s bloc to desert him.  He suggested that the coming months would be a 
“question of whether to live free or be a slave.” (28) At the same time, his allies began to 
sense a change in the air.  Yushchenko’s campaign manager and now Deputy Premier 
for Administrative Reform Roman Bezsmertnyy announced on December 12 that Our 
Ukraine would lead the second stage of the “Rise Up, Ukraine” protests.  The bloc, he 
said, “should be the leader of the protests rather than follow Tymoshenko or anyone 
else.” (29)
 
Just days later, Yushchenko announced, “Despite provocation from the presidential 
administration, we proposed dialogue for eight months in parliament.  We were rebuffed, 
but we did not fall into ambitions ä . We will be able to say with a light heart: that’s it, the 
end.  We’ve done everything we could.  They don’t understand our language.  We are 
moving to another, multi-million language.” (30) Viktor Yushchenko had finally had 
enough. 
 
From that point on, Yushchenko’s position hardened more each month.  As he received 
death threats – in spite of attempting to negotiate with Kuchma, as his family was sent 
into hiding, as he was painted a Nazi – even though his father survived Auschwitz, and 
as he survived a horrific poisoning, he turned more each day to the “radicals” he had 
pushed away for so long.  And when the time came, they welcomed him. 
 
Viktor Yushchenko’s victory was cemented by the hundreds of thousands of people who 
cheered, stomped, blew horns and chanted at Independence Square at the end of 
2004, and by his own strength during a painful, confusing and chaotic presidential 
campaign.  But, the possibility of his victory was created by those around him – the 
authorities who unbelievably rebuffed his repeated attempts at compromise, and the 
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opposition leaders who, at their own risk, prepared society for the day when Viktor 
Yushchenko would be ready to lead them. 
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